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The External Dimension of Subnational Fiscal Autonomy
Insights from the Mexican Case
Constantin Groll
Abstract
Subnational politics and federal relations are an increasingly studied aspect of Latin 
American federation. However, much of the literature neglects the importance of external 
economic conditions for the study of these phenomena and tends to reinforce the bias 
towards methodological nationalism implicit in most of the studies. This paper provides 
a first approximation to the analysis of the interdependence of global processes with 
subnational politics, while avoiding “non-institutional” as well as “non-spatial” thinking 
at the same time. It proposes the concept of subnational fiscal autonomy, defined as the 
discretionary amount of subnational revenue, in order to observe and analyze the multi-
dimensional effect of external economic conditions on subnational politics in particular 
and federal relations in general. Using panel data for the period from 1990 to 2012, 
the paper offers a quantitative analysis of the causes of the variation in subnational 
fiscal autonomy in Mexico. The results show that one can expect significant effects 
of changing external economic conditions on subnational fiscal autonomy during this 
period. The paper proposes a framework to interpret these effects. The results of this 
study provide insights for further studies of subnational politics, federal relations and 
the potential of subnational governments to pursue policies to reduce inequality.
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1. Introduction
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, Latin American federal states have experienced 
an extraordinary growth period, in many cases of duration and size not seen since the 
1930s. This period of economic bonanza, which eventually ended with decreasing 
world commodity prices, led to a significant rise in public revenue (CEPAL 2013), a 
reconfiguration of the state-society relations via a massive increase in conditional cash 
transfers (Lavinas 2013), and consequently a small but significant decrease in socio-
economic inequalities (López-Calva and Lustig 2010). Federal relations, i.e. relations 
between government levels in the federal state, were not unaffected by these changes. 
Although there is no uniform and clear overall trend observed in Latin American federal 
states, obtaining more information about the interaction between global economic 
developments and the variation in federal (power) relations may help to shed more 
light on the potentials and limitations that subnational governments face with respect 
to pursuing policies to reduce inequality.1 
Intergovernmental relations have been seldom remained stable during this period, 
and consequently dynamics in these relations have been vividly discussed in the 
comparative federalism and decentralization literatures, including studies with various 
methodological approaches and cases (Beramendi 2012; Dickovick and Eaton 2013; 
Dickovick 2007, 2011; Falleti 2010; Gibson 2012; Olmeda 2014). Some claim that 
inter-governmental power relations became either centralized – for example in the 
case of Argentina (Cherny et al. 2010; González 2010) or decentralized as in the case 
of Mexico (Hernández Rodríguez 2008). However, the importance of the external 
economic dimension of such changes has been either neglected or treated as a 
merely contextual category. In other words, such contributions do not only risk having 
findings that vary unpredictably due to omission of the significant effects arising out 
of the global embeddedness of socio-political processes – i.e. the changes in inter-
governmental power relations – in the nation state but ultimately reinforce a bias towards 
methodological nationalism (Chernilo 2006). This is not only surprising because of the 
exceptionality of the recent growth period, but also because in other research fields 
(security, welfare) the global embeddedness of domestic political and social processes 
is described as increasingly relevant.
1 Thanks to the decentralization reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, spending authority has become 
increasingly fragmented between different government levels. Today, subnational governments are 
co-responsible for the provision of social services such as in-kind transfers in the area of health and 
education. Yet as studies show, these are exactly the areas of social spending which are decisive for 
a sustainable reduction of (income) inequality in the long run (Lustig et al. 2013). 
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In contrast, this paper seeks to explore directly the inter-relationship between changing 
external economic circumstances and federal relations inside the nation state. Taking the 
external dimension of federal relations into account, this paper combines a theoretical 
perspective which avoids, one the one hand, “non-spatial thinking”, in the sense 
that it does not treat states as territories of governance which behave like abstract, 
homogenous containers. Quite to the contrary, the interdependence between domestic 
institutions and external factors is taken seriously, not only in that domestic responses 
to global changes are understood as depending on a specific domestic institutional 
setting, but also in the sense that global and domestic politics are inseparably inter-
related in a world of economic interdependence. On the other hand, the theoretical 
perspective guiding this contribution aims to avoid “non-institutional” thinking. This 
is admitting that spatial relations historically have been mainly “territorially-defined 
relations” (Robinson 2007: 15).2 
In applying such a theoretical perspective for the study of the inter-relationship between 
global economic dynamics and inter-governmental relations, three specifications have 
to be made: Firstly, the empirical analysis is limited to the fiscal relations between 
government levels only. This may be perceived as a limitation because relations 
between government levels in federal states are multi-dimensional, complex and 
often contradicting (Montero and Samuels 2004). However, the standard literature on 
federations emphasizes that (independent) fiscal policy is a keystone of autonomous 
subnational governance (Davis 1956; Nathan and Balmaceda 1990; Oates 1999) 
and is, in fact, an elementary pre-condition for the functioning of subnational (public) 
institutions. Thus “fiscal independence” was perceived as “substantially similar to those 
tenets of subnational autonomy involved in regard to constitutional independence” 
(Davis 1956: 17).3 In addition, this paper argues that the ongoing dynamics of the 
interdependence between external and subnational circumstances can be observed 
precisely via the focus on fiscal relations.
Secondly, the analysis has to be multi-level in nature. With few exceptions (Beramendi 
2012), most of the comparative federalism literature is biased towards a binary logic 
in its analysis: i.e. this literature either captures changes in the relationship between 
the federal and the subnational level (e.g. Gibson 2012) or changes in the relationship 
2 It is widely agreed that social forces are largely mediated by territory, and territory in the Westphalian 
state system is overwhelmingly defined by nation-states (at least if it comes to politics) with particular 
domestic institutions and historical legacies (see also Leicht and Jenkins 2007). This paper also 
considers nation-states and domestic institutions to be relevant but argues that this perspective 
should also be more sensitive to the spatial interdependencies and mechanisms through which 
processes of diffusion, (political) interactions or power are organized and related.
3 Moreover, it has been argued that the core question of whether “subnational autonomy is fiscally 
protected [...] becomes a core test of the autonomy (self-rule) principle” (Agranoff 2004: 43).
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between territorial defined political units at the same (subnational) level. However, 
in federal relations, there is hardly any major policy issue which does not have an 
impact on both relationships. The paper therefore presents in Section 2 an analytical 
perspective to understand the multi-level effect of external economic developments on 
subnational finances, i.e. a possibility to observe changes along a national-subnational 
as well as along a subnational-subnational axis at the same time. 
Finally, this paper introduces a novel method of measuring the concept of subnational 
fiscal autonomy (Section 2) and empirically asks whether external economic 
developments have an effect on the variation of subnational fiscal autonomy, and if 
so, what kind. Subnational fiscal autonomy is understood here as a heuristic concept 
and principally serves as a proxy to observe the changing dynamics of power relations 
in federal systems in a multi-level perspective, i.e. to observe the variation in fiscal 
resources over which subnational governments have complete and autonomous 
decision-making authority. Subnational fiscal autonomy is defined as the capacity of 
subnational governments to collect and spend revenues with discretion, i.e. without the 
interference of or legal control by other levels of government.4 In contrast to much of 
the decentralization literature, which is primarily concerned with the institutional or legal 
modifications in relations between government levels, the concept as used here provides 
the advantage of observing the annual outcome of variation among all subnational 
units (collective subnational autonomy) and between subnational units (individual 
subnational autonomy). In addition, as recent contributions in the fiscal federalism 
literature have argued (Blöchliger and Petzold 2009; Stegarescu 2005), it is superior 
to classical measures of fiscal decentralization as it takes only the fiscal resources 
into account over which subnational decision-making authority is unbounded (in other 
words autonomous). Finally, it provides a net indicator to understand the fiscal ability of 
subnational governments to pursue inequality-reducing policies by themselves, which 
can be especially useful for understanding the potential of subnational government in 
the recent period of inequality reduction.
The paper presents evidence for the importance of external economic developments 
for the variation in subnational fiscal autonomy in Mexico in the period between 
1990 and 2012. 5 The decision to select Mexico as a case study may be surprising 
at first glance. Frequently Mexican federalism is labeled as a deviant case. Although 
4 This paper only analyzes the revenue dimension of subnational fiscal autonomy. An analysis of the 
expenditure dimension can be found in (Groll 2015a). 
5 It is important to note that this paper analyzes the fiscal autonomy of the second tier state level, 
i.e state governments. Although municipal governments are constitutionally independent and an 
important feature of Mexican federalism, due to reasons of complexity and space they will not be 
analyzed in this paper. 
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constitutionally defined as a federal polity, including politically autonomous levels of 
government (Serna 2008), or “self-rule” (Elazar 1987:12), the Mexican federation is 
described in a comparative perspective as a highly demos-enabling federation (Stepan 
2004: 46).6 However, analyzed on its own, and taking the particularities of the Mexican 
state-building process into account, the Mexican federalism experienced a certain 
subnational “revival” since the mid-1980s (Díaz Cayeros 2006). In particular, state 
governments were able to explore new, often informal, sources of power and gained 
increasing importance in national as well as subnational political arenas as well (Benton 
2012; Flamand 2006; Hernández Rodríguez 2003, 2008; Langston 2010).
Moreover, the Mexican case provides several advantages to study the influence 
of external economic conditions on subnational fiscal autonomy, given the specific 
integration of the Mexican economy into the world market. On the one hand, the 
country’s finances are exceptionally connected to international commodity prices, in 
particular the price for oil. Revenues from oil production reached up to 39% of general 
government revenues during 1990-2012 (SHCP 2014). On the other hand, Mexico’s 
economic development model is fundamentally oriented towards the global market. 
The 1982 economic crisis, which was followed by the oil price shock four years later, 
marked the turning point for the Mexican economy and the Mexican development 
strategy changed from import substitution to an export-orientated industrialization within 
the framework of trade liberalization (including NAFTA), de-regulation, privatization, 
and the withdrawal of the state from much of the economy (Moreno-Brid and Ros 
2009). This makes the Mexican economy extremely sensitive to dynamics in the global 
economy and thus an almost exemplary case to study the inter-relationship between 
global economic dynamics and the variation in inter-governmental fiscal relations.
Methodologically, the empirical analysis combines a short qualitative historical 
contextualization of subnational fiscal autonomy in Mexico as well as statistical tests 
of the external effects on subnational fiscal autonomy. The latter analysis rests on a 
regression analysis of an unbalanced, short panel data set with data for a period from 
1990 to 2012. The data set combines fiscal, social, political, and economic indicators 
for each subnational unit (cross-sectional) as well as the changes of these indicators 
over time (time series).7 The statistical analysis is performed using different estimation 
techniques adequate for panel data: pooled OLS, fixed effects (FEM) and random 
6 This is because malapportionment is comparatively low in both chambers of Congress, the policy 
scope of the Senate is limited, and the federal executive can intervene in subnational units. Thanks 
to the legacy of the period of PRI hegemony, the party system is centralized, the ability of subnational 
governments to effectively control subnational political competition is comparatively limited and the 
Mexican constitution empowers municipalities (Groll 2015b).
7 In total, the data set encompasses 86 variables representing 739 observations.
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effect (REM) model specification. Estimation results are controlled for cross-sectional 
and serial correlation using robust covariance matrix estimators (Driscoll and Kraay 
1998).
Before presenting this analysis in Section 4, Section 2 describes and justifies the 
introduction of the concept of subnational fiscal autonomy and presents an analytical 
framework to estimate the possible effects. Based on a discussion of the literature, 
the section argues that subnational fiscal autonomy is a suitable approximation to 
understand better the interaction between global economic circumstances and 
domestic realities in federal states. In addition, this section presents an analytical 
perspective to understand the multi-level effect of external economic developments 
on subnational finances. Section 3 of the paper provides a short introduction to the 
context of subnational fiscal autonomy in Mexico. 
2. Subnational Fiscal Autonomy and Global Economic Dynamics 
Subnational fiscal autonomy is a useful approximation to analyze the translation of 
global economic process into subnational politics within a federal polity. In a more 
abstract sense, this concept offers a possibility to open the discussion in the comparative 
federalism literature to take the global-national-subnational interdependence of federal 
relations into account, providing new insights for the study of federal relations. Before 
clarifying and justifying the selection of this concept, this section first gives credit to the 
literature that theorizes federal relations as a (ongoing) bargaining process instead of a 
stable and (formally) institutionalized relationship. However, although such a perspective 
has gained wide prominence in the recent literature on Latin American federations, 
the external dimension of this bargaining process is generally omitted. This omission 
makes it difficult to make sense of federal dynamics in an increasingly interconnected, 
globalized world and also ends up reinforcing methodological nationalism. Therefore 
the concept of subnational fiscal autonomy is introduced and a simple framework to 
understand the possible – multidimensional – effects of changing global economic 
developments on the revenue autonomy of subnational governments is presented. 
2.1 Federal Relations as an Ongoing Bargaining Process
Classic federal theory informs us that federalism “is a process as well as a structure” 
(Elazar 1987; Friedrich 1965; Ostrom 1994), in the sense that the institutionalized 
division of political authority (Herrschaft) – for example within the constitution – is only 
robust, if credible guarantees and supportive institutions (political parties, judiciary 
system, etc.) exist (Bednar 2005; Bednar et al 2001; Riker 1964). Nevertheless, at the 
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same time the “very things which make federalism desirable and occasionally possible 
also make it unstable and occasionally perishable” (Riley 1973: 120). In other words, 
federal bargaining outcomes will be dependent on the changes in (other) political and 
juridical institutions, because a federal contract “can only be [a] formalized transaction 
of a moment in the history of a particular community” (Davis 1978). In this sense, a 
federal state structure produces a “complex reality in constant flux” (Beramendi 2007: 
759), where bargaining outcomes are temporal and do not lead to a final “institutional” 
outcome but are unstable and contested and reflect the “ebb and flow of authority 
among levels of government” (Filippov et al. 2004: 10). 
Moreover, in Latin America the bargaining between national and subnational actors “is 
bargaining over things in limited supply – authority, revenue, jurisdiction, power [...]” 
(Filippov et al. 2004: 12) and frequently one can observe not only a single collective 
action problem but also an “interconnected web of collective action problems” (Bednar 
2005: 12). It is this momentum, which nurtures the bargaining between government 
levels in a continuous way and which makes fiscal and administrative relations 
between government levels in an externally (economic) dependent state a competitive 
bargaining system rather than a joint decision making system (Braun 2003).
Recent scholarship on federal relations in Latin America confirmed this perspective 
and offered new insights on the – typically informal and temporary – changes in 
federal power relations in Argentina (Gibson 2012; Giraudy 2009; González 2010; 
Lodola 2011; Wibbels 2005), Brazil (Montero and Samuels 2004), Mexico (Edmonds-
Poli 2006; Hernández Rodríguez 2008; Modoux 2006) or even Bolivia (Dickovick and 
Eaton 2013; Faguet 2013). These contributions, although convincingly specifying the 
domestic (formal and informal) institutional factors which influence the bargaining 
process, too often omit the embeddedness of such federal power dynamics into 
global economic processes which occur outside the nation state. This may be one 
reason why such primarily neo-institutionalist research ultimately fails to provide a 
satisfactory explanation for the ambiguous performance of federal systems, the perils 
of decentralization (Wibbels 2006) or the subnational heterogeneity in political and 
social processes within the same country.
Consequently such literature is not only running into a “territorial trap” (Agnew 1994:53):, 
but ultimately reinforces the methodological nationalism within their analysis. However, 
as the discussion in the (critical) political geography literature argued, the vision of the 
centrality of state territories and (the states’) scalar hierarchies is an “impossible dream 
of imposing closure” (Cox 2013: 13). Movements or economic flows are never spatially 
structured in a hierarchical fashion, because “the positioning of separate levels in a 
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scalar hierarchy which then interact is to endow them with a capacity, a power that they 
cannot have in and of themselves” (Cox 2013: 13). Movements of economic flows, 
especially the mechanisms of capital accumulation in global capitalism, likely form 
their own territorialities, which then may provide an unstable ground on which state 
territories exists and change (Brenner 2004; Harvey 2006; Knox et al. 2014). State 
institutions may try to regulate – for example via modes of representation, via the internal 
organization of the state or via other modes of intervention (Jessop 1990) – these other 
forms of territoriality (for example the private or the economic) but territoriality in itself 
is not reducible to the state (Cox 2013: 13).
For the analysis of federal relations, these insights imply that states and their territorial 
sub-units should not be treated like territories of governance, which behave like abstract, 
homogenous containers. Quite to the contrary, the interdependence between domestic 
institutions and external factors has to be taken seriously, not only in the sense that 
domestic responses to global economic processes depend on the specific domestic 
institutional setting,8 but also in the sense that global and domestic processes are 
inseparable in a world of economic interdependence. 
Moreover, it becomes important to follow an analytical perspective which is sensitive 
to networks and flows that crisscross jurisdictional boundaries the interdependence 
between global and local factors for the explanation of social phenomena and especially 
for the question of power. Although, as Cox (1998) points out, institutionalized political 
actors may be in a prime position to control an area, their ability to perform this task is 
inherently incomplete, as social struggles are continuously propelled by material and 
social dynamics that transcend jurisdictional limits. Consequently, such a perspective is 
important to understand the dynamics of federal relations, as it is sensitive to changes 
which do not directly translate in an (formal) institutional shift along jurisdictional 
boundaries. It helps to shed greater light to the dynamics within the changing relations 
between subnational units as well as between the federal and subnational level, 
because such dynamics are essentially fluid and dynamic; “that is, in terms of the ebb 
and flow of particular tendencies and countertendencies that may shift considerably – 
weather gradually or rapidly – over time and space” (Bates and Smith 2008: 200).
8 For such an argument, see the literature on domestic institutional change within the process of 
globalization (Braun and Trein 2013; Genschel 2002; Swank 2002).
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2.2 Subnational Fiscal Autonomy
In order to apply such a spatially sensitive perspective to the study of the dynamics 
in federal relations this paper proposes to analyze the changes in subnational fiscal 
autonomy in Mexico during the last two decades. Subnational fiscal autonomy is defined 
quite straightforwardly as the ability of subnational governments to collect and spend 
fiscal resources in a discretional way, i.e. without the interference of other government 
levels or agencies. Subnational fiscal autonomy is (at least) two-dimensional and can be 
divided into expenditure and revenue autonomy of subnational units.9 Due to reasons 
of space, this paper analyzes the revenue dimension only. It can be measured both 
collectively (and in relation to the federal level) as the overall average fiscal autonomy 
of all subnational units or individually, as well as the fiscal autonomy of one subnational 
unit. This allows for a multi-level analysis (vertical and horizontal). 
Subnational fiscal autonomy is meant to be a heuristic concept here. Its principal 
purpose is analytical and not normative. For example, the analysis of subnational 
fiscal autonomy does not per se aim to establish a connection between an increase 
in fiscal autonomy and an increase in expenditure or revenue collection efficiency, 
nor does it provide information about a possible decrease or increase in democratic 
responsiveness of subnational governments due to an increase fiscal autonomy. It 
rather aims to inform an understanding of the interdependence between global 
economic processes and discretionary fiscal resources of subnational governments 
and the resulting consequences for the intergovernmental relations in a federation. 
 
As mentioned, federal relations are complex, multi-dimensional and dynamic. The focus 
on subnational fiscal autonomy does not aim to neglect possible other or connected 
sources of autonomy of subnational governments within such relations, whether 
political or institutional. This paper rather proposes to understand fiscal autonomy as 
one approximation to observe, in a systematic and comparable manner, the horizontal 
and vertical dynamics of power relations in a federal state under the influence of a 
changing external economic environment – controlled for other, non-fiscal sources of 
autonomy.10 
9 Subnational fiscal autonomy has been analyzed in previous studies (Dickovick 2011; Pola 2015). 
However, in contrast to earlier attempts, this paper conceptualizes the fiscal autonomy of subnational 
governments in fiscal terms only, measuring the amount of fiscal resources subnational governments 
can spend discretionally.
10 In other words, it is a trade-off between a concept open to spatially sensitive thinking and, at the 
same time, avoiding non-institutional thinking.
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Nevertheless, the selection of the fiscal aspect of autonomy is not arbitrary. Firstly, 
public finances are especially suitable to observe the interaction between global and 
subnational processes. This is especially true in the case of Latin America as most 
federation’s public finances have been highly sensitive to the developments in the 
global economy. Finally, within a historical perspective public finances and the quest of 
allocation of revenues along the different government levels has been the cornerstone 
of the state-building process in Latin American federations, including Mexico (Aboites 
Aguilar 2003; Carmagnani and Bidart Campos 1993; Centeno and Ferraro 2013). Such 
historical contributions illustrate that a fiscal perspective on subnational autonomy 
enables an exploration of the material and, indirectly, social (pre-) conditions, in which 
such autonomy is nested.
However, in order to prevent confusion, the use of the term autonomy needs to be 
specified more closely. The way the term is used in this paper aims to prioritize neither 
a structural nor an agency-based perspective.11 This means that, while subnational 
governments’ autonomy is – formally and informally – institutionally constrained, if fiscal 
autonomy increases, governments have more opportunities to pursue their own goals.12 
However, autonomy as used here should not be confused with influence or capacity. 
The principal interest here is to observe the ability or power of subnational governments 
to do things. “Influence”, in contrast, as suggested by Morriss (2002) “sometimes (and 
typically) does not” (Morriss 2002: 11) include such ability. Subnational fiscal autonomy 
is also different from the concept of simple subnational fiscal capacity, as the latter 
term too often conflates discretionary subnational government fiscal resources with 
resources which are bound to some kind of control by others. 
2.3 A Framework to Understand the (Multi-level) Effects of Global Economic  
 Changes on Subnational Fiscal Autonomy
One of the aims of this paper is to understand whether and how subnational fiscal 
autonomy is affected by changes in the external economic environment. In general, one 
can assume three possible transmission channels via such an interaction is possible: 
the presence of (externally induced) crisis, the specific form of integration into the 
global market via strong export ties or reliance on commodity exports, or access to 
11 In other words, there is no intent to decide the question of the priority of agency vs. structure, echoing 
the debate of the problem of structure versus agency in sociology (Barnes 2001; Sewell 1992) – i.e. 
that either the agency (the actions of individuals, groups, or in this case subnational governments) or 
relatively stable patterns of social relations should be taken into account in the explanation of social 
processes and behavior.
12 This said, there may be other ways how subnational governments may increase this possibility, as 
specified, for example by Gibson (2005, 2012), however often these strategies are doomed to be 
temporal and unit-specific. 
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global capital markets, either via foreign direct investments or the possibility to contract 
(external) debt. The importance of these channels can be either argued to be specific 
for each region and case, with respect to their historical importance for Latin American 
economies in general and Mexico in particular (Bértola and Ocampo 2013; Moreno-
Brid and Ros 2009). In addition, these transmission channels occupy a disproportionate 
relevance in the Latin American economic development literature, in general, and for 
public finances in particular. In Section 4, the paper presents some indicators in order 
to operationalize these three possible causes of variation – i.e. increase or decrease – 
in subnational fiscal autonomy. 
Nevertheless, as subnational units are part of the federal polity, such an effect is likely 
to be mediated by the domestic conditions in which subnational fiscal autonomy is 
embedded. Two characteristics of a federal polity illustrate the country-specific domestic 
institutional setting which constrains or empowers the autonomy of subnational 
governments and their fiscal autonomy in particular: the institutional asymmetries of 
the federal polity and the characteristics of the regime of fiscal distribution. Both are 
intrinsically connected but analytical separable. 
Institutional asymmetries describe the vertical – i.e. asymmetries between government 
levels of a different order (central vs. regional; central vs. local, regional vs. local) – and 
horizontal asymmetries – i.e. asymmetries between government levels of the same 
order (regional vs. regional, local vs. local). Such asymmetries can be caused by formal 
(constitution, laws) as well as informal institutional (party dynamics) arrangements and 
both are the result of the (historical) state-building process of a given country. Vertical 
institutional asymmetries are the defining feature of a federal polity, as federalism aims 
to constitutionally increase the center-constraining aspect of the polity (for and overview 
see Burgess 2006). Horizontal asymmetries – that is between subnational units – may 
be the result of constitutional or anti-constitutional (positive) discrimination of singular 
subnational units due to historical, ethnic, or linguistic factors, or – more important in 
the case of Latin American federations – via different weights of a subnational unit’s 
influence in the federal political arena, for example in the form of malapportionment. 
The regime of fiscal distribution in a federation is the second domestic institutional 
feature in which subnational fiscal autonomy is embedded. In principle, in addition to 
inter-personal or intra-group distribution, such a regime may also encompass features 
of inter-regional distribution and the allocation of revenue collection separately from 
expenditures.13 More specifically, one can argue that three aspects of the regime 
of fiscal distribution are important for subnational fiscal autonomy: its re-distributive 
13 Allocation between the federation and sub-units as well as among regions or sub-units.
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nature, the structure of the tax system, and the existence of direct compensational 
mechanisms for resource-rich subnational units. These three aspects function like 
institutional filters that mold the effect of external factors on subnational autonomy. 
Depending on the design and coexistence of these three aspects, external effects can 
be expected to interact differently with subnational autonomy (Groll 2015a).
Consequently, explaining the effects of changing external economic conditions on 
subnational fiscal autonomy requires taking into account the institutional setting which 
molds such a relationship. One possibility to theorize this relationship is to think of the 
interaction between domestic institutional conditions and changing external economic 
developments in a multi-level perspective. 
On the one hand, external factors may increase the (fiscal) autonomy of subnational 
governments in relation to other domestic influences. That is, the effect of such factors 
will increase autonomous fiscal resources of a subnational unit in comparison to other 
units and consequently make them less dependent on conditional fiscal resources 
form the central government level thanks to a higher amount of discretionary fiscal 
resources. Thus, external factors may increase the unit’s autonomy from domestic 
influence. On the other hand, it is conceivable that there may be a domestic institutional 
setting which limits the dangers but also the possibilities of a positive or negative global 
economic development on subnational fiscal autonomy. This would mean that the 
combined result of this interaction may either strengthen the autonomy of subnational 
units against external threats or weaken the fiscal resistance of such subnational units. 
Table 1 combines these two effects on subnational autonomy in a two by two table. 
One could conceive of external factors that, in combination with the existing institutional 
filters in Mexico, led to a higher autonomy of subnational units form domestic and 
external influence (high/high). Next, one can expect an interaction which will produce 
a lower subnational autonomy from domestic as well as from external influence (low/
low). Further the effect produced may, on the one hand, strengthen the autonomy of the 
subnational unit form domestic influence but make it at the same time more exposed 
to external influences (low/high). Finally, the interaction of domestic institutional filters 
and external effects can also lead to an opposite scenario. Subnational autonomy from 
external influence may be high but the unit’s autonomy from domestic influence will be 
low (high/low). Table 1 provides a schematic overview of the possible combinations. 
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Table 1: Schematic Effects of the Interaction between Domestic and External 
Factors on Subnational Autonomy 
Autonomy from domestic influence
High Low
Autonomy from 
external influence
High (High / High) (High / Low)
Low (Low / High) (Low / Low)
Source: Own elaboration.
In sum, the resulting effect of a change in external economic developments on 
subnational fiscal autonomy will likely depend on the domestic institutional setting 
present in a given federation. As this condition is country-specific and bound to the 
historical evolution of each federation, the next section presents these configurations 
for the Mexican case. However, the following description aims to highlight that both 
domestic institutional features – the characteristics of regime of fiscal distribution as 
well as the evolution of institutional asymmetries – are not only conditioned by domestic 
struggles, but the result of a federal bargaining which is interdependent with global 
economic developments over time. 
3. Contextualizing Subnational Fiscal Autonomy in Mexico
Domestic factors are often highlighted when describing the evolution of federal 
relations in Mexico and to explain the struggle of authority and resources. This is a 
plausible account, as the predominant feature of the Mexican state-building process is 
the centralized party system and specifically, since the Mexican Revolution, the period 
of the hegemonic one-party rule of the PRI party. Studies continue to claim that the 
rise of the importance of subnational governments after the mid-1990s was either due 
to the fading control of the central executive over subnational politicians via the party 
channel (Hernández Rodríguez 2003, 2008) or with a decisive strategy of the PRI 
party to “decentralize” resources and power to inferior government levels in order to 
counteract the assumed negative effects of a loss of the federal presidency after the 
1990s (Díaz Cayeros 2006). However, this process was limited and in a comparative 
perspective the Mexican federal design continues to be demos-enabling including a 
relatively high level of fiscal administration. 
This section does not aim to overturn all of the conclusions of previous studies. 
However, it attemps to correct the oversight of the significant importance of external 
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economic developments in the making of the domestic institutional conditions that 
mark Mexican federalism today. This said, the history of Mexican federalism is too rich 
to present in full here, so the focus is on the importance of the external dimension in 
specific events relevant for subnational fiscal autonomy, particularly the events that led 
to the establishment of the institutional filters in which subnational fiscal autonomy is 
embedded. 
Today fiscal authority is highly concentrated in the hands of the central government in 
Mexico. Except for some minor taxes, the federal government level collects all major 
taxes within what is known as the National System of Fiscal Coordination (SNCF).14 
This system emerged in 1979/80 and specifies – today – in addition the legal allocation 
of tax authority, also the mechanisms by which tax revenue is shared between the three 
levels of government. This system divides the overall tax revenue subject to sharing 
(recaudación federal participable) between the levels of government via different 
transfer mechanisms. Two of them are the most important: automatic, unconditional 
transfers (participaciones) and conditional transfers for specific spending purposes 
(aportaciones). Aportaciones represent, on average, over 46% of total revenue (in 
2011) and are currently distributed via eight transfer funds for specific spending 
purposes. Subnational governments have no or only very limited discretion over these 
funds.15 Participaciones – representing around 32% of total state revenue (in 2011) – 
are distributed according to a formula stipulated in the Fiscal Coordination Law and 
applied to the amount of federal revenue subject to sharing. These funds are genuinely 
subnational. The distributive effect of the participaciones system gradually changed 
since the 1980s,16 but it is still – thanks to the origin of the system as a proportional 
compensation of the state’s share of the previously existing federal sales tax (Impuesto 
14 Today subnational units collect only a tiny part – approx. 5% – of total general government revenue 
(OECD 2014). Although comparatively low, Mexican states do have a significant amount of revenues 
they can collect and spend without the interference of other government level. Currently states collect 
around 7 own taxes on average, which in total sum up to a revenue effort of 0.45% of GDP (OECD 
2014).
15 It was not until the first year of the divided congress in 1997 that a regularization of the financial 
aspect of the administrative decentralization occurred. Various previously separate federal spending 
items were merged into one budget item with one formula, combining various “radically different” 
(Flores and Trillo 2004: 134) funds which had used distinctive distributional formulas.
16 With the years the actual distribution formula was object to frequent changes, most notably in the 
end of the 1990s. Moreover, the federal government, at least during the 1990s, possessed some 
discretion over the effective distribution. Overall compensatory criteria were introduced in the revenue 
sharing formula and the population criteria gained more weight. As a result, the derivation principle in 
the allocation of fiscal resources was weakened (Cadena and Gobierno del Estado de Puebla 1996; 
Aguilar Villanueva 1996).
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Sobre Ingresos Mercantiles – ISIM) – following a derivation principle,17 rewards states 
with the best economic performance.
Generally, the high concentration of fiscal authority as well as the rise of SNCF is 
explained with the extreme centralization of the party system during the PRI hegemony. 
Indeed this is an important point to make as the hegemonic PRI party system enabled 
a decoupling of subnational politicians interest from their respective unit (Díaz Cayeros 
2006). However, the creation of the SNCF was by no means the first centralization effort 
in the history of Mexican federalism (Aboites Aguilar 2003) and thus such arguments do 
not explain why the resistance of subnational governments to an increased centralization 
vanished over time (and especially in 1979). In fact, an important missing part of the 
explanation may have to do with the fiscal and economic circumstances. Economic 
developments certainly influenced the reasons why subnational governments joined 
the voluntary tax sharing system. After a phase of economic stagnation – including 
rising debt18 – in the late 1960s and early 1970s from 1977 onwards exploitation of the 
newly discovered oil resources in southern Mexico and their sale on the international 
market would bring a swift and strong recovery.19 In fiscal terms, this oil boom translated 
predominantly into an increase in federal revenue because the taxation of subsoil 
resources was assigned in the constitution to the federal level. Thus the rationale of 
subnational governments was to take at least indirectly part in the oil boom and the 
positive economic development via unconditional automatic tax sharing. Indeed, after 
the installation of the SNCF, no state received fewer revenues than before, although 
states had relinquished almost all of their revenue raising authority (Díaz Cayeros 
2006).
A second important “institutional filter” of the regime of fiscal distribution in Mexico 
today is the non-existence of any direct transfer mechanism of compensation for oil 
producing states. Unlike in many other countries, oil producing states are not directly 
compensated for the extraction of oil resources in their territory. In contrast, oil revenues 
– representing up to one-third of general government revenue – are shared between 
the federal and subnational governments and distributed via the participaciones 
17 In sum, this meant that the poorer states received smaller per capita transfers than economically 
“richer” states (Díaz Cayeros 1995: 94). This principle was reinforced with the tax reform in 2007.
18 By 1970, the external public debt to GDP ratio reached 12% (compared to 1% in 1946) (INEGI 
1999), and in 1968 amortization and interest payments on medium and long-term external public 
debt represented close to 30% of exports (Hansen 1971).
19 Indeed, from 1978 to 1981 economic growth recovered strongly, leading to a period of economic 
expansion at rates well above the historical norm, led by oil production (19.4% annual growth) and 
oil exports (52.7% annual growth) (Moreno-Brid and Ros 2009).
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system.20 Generally this absence is explained in historical terms and the centralizing 
tendencies in the state building process in Mexico as the authority over subsoil 
resources and the resulting possible revenues were already assigned to the federal 
government in the constitution of 1917. However, the history of revenue centralization 
of subsoil revenues in Mexico is more complicated, and included also either the direct 
participation of subnational elites in the exploration process, as in the case of mining 
revenues (Carmagnani 1993: 163-164; Haber et al. 2003; Martinez Fritscher 2011), 
or the direct compensation of oil-producing states before the nationalization of the oil 
industries in the year 1938.21 
Taking external economic developments into account, it is important to note that the 
mechanism of direct compensation for oil-producing states did only come to an end 
as the federal government succeeded to install a new regulatory code in 1940 with 
the aim to foster the operation of PEMEX, which was heavily hit by the nationalization 
and the loss of international markets due to the World War II. As a result, the tax 
burden was lowered and the contribution to oil producing states significantly reduced 
(Aboites Aguilar 2003: 104). Especially for oil-producing states like Veracruz, this 
meant a significant loss in revenue and consequently fiscal resources.22 Although the 
contribution of PEMEX to the federal state did settle down to an average of 13.1% 
of total federal tax revenue from 1941 to 1951 (Aboites Aguilar 2003: 189), the 
nationalization of the company and the subsequent federal regulations canceled any 
20 Currently oil production and exportation contributes via different concepts to states’ revenue. The 
main revenues are generated via a kind of hydrocarbon tax (derechos ordinarios), levied on the 
income of PEMEX at a current rate of 71.5%, a special tax on production and services (Impuesto 
Especial sobre Producción y Servicios – IEPS) applied to gasoline and diesel sales, a tax on oil 
yield, and aprovechamiento sobre rendimientos excedentes. Revenues from oil production compose 
approx. one-third of total revenues as in December of 2010, a figure almost identical to the year 
1990. This is 7.6% of GDP for the year 2011. Figure A in the Appendix displays oil revenue as a 
percentage of GDP and as a percentage of total general government revenue. It is observable that 
Mexican fiscal dependence on oil revenues has not been effectively addressed during the last 22 
years, as the share of oil revenues to total revenues was not reduced in any year (except 1992) 
below 25%, and in the entire period it even increased on average. Oil revenues peaked in 2006 with 
a share of over 38% of total revenues or 8.2% of GDP.
21 Another example occurred in 1922 when the government of Veracruz – by then the state with 
the most important oil extraction industry – aimed to establish a subnational tax on oil production 
(Aboites Aguilar 2003: 104). In constitutional terms this was an open attack on the validity of Article 
24 of the Constitution. The federal government, rejecting this initiative, decided instead to share 
with oil extracting and refining states the amount of five percent of the revenues of the federal tax 
on hydrocarbon production in the form of automatic transfers. This initiative did not only show that 
the federal government’s authority over revenue from subsoil resources was by no means initially 
accepted by all states, it also set the blueprint for the upcoming “federalization” of federal taxes.
22 Despite constant claims of governors of oil-producing states, PEMEX was even freed to pay the land 
property tax, which was at that time still under the control of the states.
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major benefits for oil-producing states and established the priority of federal matters 
against any particularistic subnational interest.23
Both accounts continue to be of importance for the embeddedness of subnational fiscal 
autonomy in Mexico today, because they describe the critical events that gave rise to 
the decisive features – or institutional filters – of the regime of fiscal distribution in which 
subnational fiscal autonomy is embedded. Moreover, these short descriptions indicate 
that one should not neglect the importance of global economic developments when 
describing the evolution of these institutional filters. This means that external factors 
like global economic developments are – in interaction with domestic constellations 
– historically important for understanding the rise of the domestic institutional setting 
within which subnational fiscal autonomy is embedded. This section presented support 
for the historical importance of the interaction between external circumstances and 
federal-level factors to understand the embeddedness of subnational fiscal autonomy. 
The next section goes on to test whether external factors have had a persistent and 
on-going impact on the fiscal autonomy of subnational governments in recent decades.
4. Quantitative Analysis of the External Dimension of    
 Subnational Fiscal Autonomy in Mexico
This section analyzes the nature and extent of influence of external economic 
developments on subnational fiscal autonomy in Mexico for the period from 1990 to 
2012, for which reliable data is available. Before discussing the results of the quantitative 
analysis, the following paragraphs describe the choice and operationalization of the 
dependent and independent variables and justify the model selection. It is important to 
note that the analysis is limited to the revenue dimension of subnational fiscal autonomy 
in order to leave enough space for interpretation and discussion of estimation results.24 
The operationalization of subnational discretional revenues in Mexico is straightforward. 
The basic rationale behind this indicator – calculated in per capita values in thousand 
23 One should not forget that the nationalization of the oil industry was also heavily promoted via a 
popular public discourse in which regional concerns played no role. The symbolic and material 
importance of PEMEX is very well described in the words of Antonio Bermúdez, the director of 
PEMEX in 1947: “La institución [...] es de carácter eminentemente nacional. De ella depende en gran 
parte el bienestar y prosperidad del país. Nadie tiene derecho a poner en peligro por intransigencias, 
descuidos, o actividades egoistas. Implica un interés superior e inviolable, que es el de la Patria 
misma. Y a ella deben subordinarse las pasiones, los apetitos y, cuando sea necesario hasta los 
intereses legítimos” (Bermúdez 1958: 148). 
24  An analysis of the expenditure dimension of subnational autonomy has also been pursued elsewhere 
(see Groll 2015a). 
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Mexican pesos at 2010 prices for each year and unit 25 – is to measure as close as 
possible the amount of revenue that the subnational government can dispose without 
the intervention or conditionality of other government levels. In other words, this 
measure tries to reflect the fiscal resources that subnational governments can dispose 
in an autonomous way. In the Mexican case, this means that discretional revenues are 
calculated as tax revenues of a state plus non-tax revenues of a state plus automatic 
unconditional federal transfers of the federal tax sharing mechanism (sistema de 
coordinación fiscal), also known as participaciones (for data sources see Table 4 in the 
Appendix). 
As mentioned above, the influence of external economic developments on (sub-) 
national finances is possible via three transmission channels: (externally induced) crisis, 
integration into the global market via strong export ties or the reliance on commodity 
exports and the access to global capital markets, either via foreign direct investments 
or the possibility to contract (external) debt. However, there are various challenges in 
the construction of reliable and valid measures for external effects at the subnational 
level in Mexico. First of all, state level data for exports is not reliable for the period 
before 2007. In addition, the identification of subnational external debt is challenging. 
Subnational debt is generally reported as total stock and cannot be differentiated 
between domestic and external debt.26 This is the reason why subnational debt is not 
considered as an external factor in the analysis, although it is included to investigate 
likely general influences.
Table 5 in the Appendix summarizes the variables representing likely external 
economic factors which may affect subnational fiscal autonomy. Three indicators 
measure the effects of a (externally induced) crisis. The rationale behind the 
operationalization is that a national crisis can trickle down to the subnational economy 
and translate into pressure on subnational finances and/or a decline in federal transfers. 
Crisis may affect subnational fiscal autonomy indirectly via the presence of a national 
crisis and directly via the interaction of the national crisis with the performance of the 
subnational economy or subnational unemployment. The existence of a national crisis 
is calculated as a dummy variable (variable name: CRISIS_RR), where the value one 
25 The choice to calculate the measure on a per capita basis was made (a) due to the fact that measures 
for gross state product (GSP) are not reliable for the entire period, and (b) in order to express the 
amount of discretional revenue in relation to the possible recipients of such revenues not in relation 
to other government levels, as would be the case if it were to be calculated as a share of total 
revenue of subnational units). 
26 Unlike in other Latin American federations, external subnational debt in Mexico is a relatively 
new phenomenon. Only with the reform of the Ley del Mercado de Valores in 2001 could states 
or municipalities issue bonds in the Mexican securities markets and thus obtain revenue from the 
(global) capital market. This relatively unregulated subnational debt avenue came to an end with the 
recent implementation of a hard budget constraint by the federal congress (Marcial Pérez 2015).
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is used to indicate the presence of a national crisis in a given year. The definition of a 
national crisis follows that used by Reinhardt and Rogoff (2009, 2011).27 The “trickle 
down” effect of a crisis to the subnational economy is measured both directly and 
indirectly. It is measured directly in the form of a reduction in subnational economic 
activity in the presence of a (externally induced) crisis of the national economy, or it is 
measured indirectly, in the form of a rise of the subnational unemployment rate (PARO) 
in the presence of a (externally induced) crisis at the federal level. The direct form is 
operationalized as the interaction of a national crisis with the annual variation of the 
states’ gross domestic product in a given year. The variation of the annual subnational 
gross domestic product (CGSP) is calculated in percentage change. 
The integration into the global economy of a subnational unit is measured via three 
variables in both countries. Unfortunately, measures for subnational export activity are 
not available before the year 2007. Alternatively, measures like the share of (formal) 
employed industrial workers (población ocupada por industria manufacturera) on 
the total subnational economic active population are misleading and are only very 
modestly correlated with contemporary subnational export figures. Although 94.65% of 
total Mexican non-oil exports between 1990 and 2012 are classified as manufactured 
goods, the bulk of non-commodity exports comes from the Mexican maquila industry. 
As a result, alternative measures likely underestimate the important role of the 
maquiladora industry in total subnational exports, especially in the northern Mexican 
states. The analysis therefore uses an alternative measure for the export activity of 
Mexican states. However, exploratory analysis for the period from 2007-2012 confirm 
the results.
In order to capture the relevance of commodity exports for Mexican states, the analysis 
test for two variables. First is a dummy variable for oil producing states (PETRO), coded 
as 1 for states with oil exploration and 0 for those without it.28 Although revenues from 
oil exploration are federalized, as explained in Section 3, there a positive influence due 
to an indirect compensation of such economic activity via the participaciones system is 
possible in theory. As a second indicator the international oil prices, expressed as the 
price for crude oil at US Dollar per barrel (bbl.) in constant 2000 US-Dollars, is introduced 
27 However, to account only for externally induced crisis, only four forms of crisis are taken into account 
from the crisis definition in Reinhardt and Rogoff: currency, inflation, external sovereign debt and 
banking crisis. Following the crisis definition, presented in chapter two, nine crisis years in the period 
from 1990 to 2012 can be identified: 1990, 1991, 1994-1999, 2000, and 2008 as a result of the global 
economic crisis.
28 Today oil is extracted in the territory of the states of Campeche, Chiapas, Puebla, San Luis Potosí, 
Tabasco and Veracruz, although in different quantities.
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into the analysis (OIL).29 Finally, the analysis tests the effects of external factors which 
express the subnational access to global capital markets, although reliable data for 
this measure is limited to foreign direct investment (FDI).30 Table 6 in the Appendix 
presents the correlation between external factors and subnational revenue autonomy 
for Mexico in the period 1990-2012. 
Three groups of variables test for alternative hypotheses and explanations for the 
variation of subnational revenue autonomy in Mexico: a first group tests for the influence 
of additional characteristics of fiscal federal relations (fiscal federalism); a second group 
of variables describes the socio-economic development of subnational units; and a 
group of variables which account for political-institutional dynamics. These indicators 
are selected because of their persistent importance in the comparative federalism and 
fiscal federalism literature. 
In order to control for possible effects of the system of fiscal federalism, the models are 
fitted with two variables, conditional federal transfers and subnational debt. Conditional 
federal transfers are calculated on a per capita basis (CCTRANS).31 Subnational debt is 
measured in the per capita debt stock in nominal prices at the end of the year (CDEBT). 
The ability to contract subnational debt is intimately related to the fiscal relationships 
between government levels: either because the federal government directly functions 
as creditor, or it is used explicitly – for example using automatic transfers as a collateral 
29 This price expresses the crude oil average spot price of Brent, Dubai and West Texas Intermediate 
Oil, equally weighted. In fact there exist various other international oil prices, depending on the 
kind of oil traded. However, this price is reasonably similar to the price for Mexican oil, which is 
determined as a function of four international oil varieties – two American crude oils: West Texas 
Sour (WTS) and Light Louisiana Sweet (LLS); one British (Brent) and a fuel oil, US Gulf Coast No.6 
3.0 % Sulfur, which is only used in daily formulas for the international price of the Maya crude. Mexico 
sells mixes of crude oils of different densities both in the domestic and in the foreign market. Mexican 
oil is classified as Maya (heavy), Istmo (light) and Olmeca (super-light).
30 These are measured in on a per capita basis for each subnational unit in US-Dollars as reported by 
the Secretaría de Economía (Dirección General de Inversión Extranjera). The inflow of FDI increased 
remarkably since the 1990s, triggered by the liberalization of trade, the incorporation into NAFTA and 
the privatization of formerly state owned enterprises. Overall FDI grew from 0.97% of GDP in the year 
1990 to over 4% in 2001. However, since 2001 the share of FDI on GDP has only surpassed the 3% 
level in three years: 2002, 2004 and 2007 and averaged at 2.56% of GDP (World Bank 2014) second 
remarkable feature of foreign direct investment in Mexico is its high concentration in few states. 
Only five states accumulated 68% of the average per capita foreign direct investment in Mexico in 
the period between 1990 and 2012: Mexico City (30%), Nuevo León (11%), Baja California (9%), 
Baja California Sur (7%), and Chihuahua (7%). All other states did not accumulate more than 3% on 
average of total FDI during this period. This evidence reflects, on the one hand, the high integration 
of the northern Mexican states at the US border within NAFTA (Baja California, Chihuahua and 
Nuevo Léon, Baja California Sur), and the importance of the maquiladora industry in some of these 
states. On the other hand, it provides evidence for the enduring importance of Mexico City as the 
main location of most headquarters of foreign companies and the resulting attraction of FDI.
31 Conditional federal transfers are all federal transfers which are pegged to a specific spending purpose 
by the federal government. Such transfers are aportaciones in the case of Mexico.
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– or implicitly – in the case of state bailouts – as lender of last resort. The second 
group of control variables includes indicators of economic and social development. 
In order to control for the effects the size of the subnational economy on subnational 
autonomy, the per capita GDP per state (CGSP) is measured. In addition, a measure 
for subnational inequality (Gini) – indicating the socio-economic inequality via the Gini 
coefficient – is applied in the analysis. 
Finally, the subnational political system has been highlighted in the decentralization 
and comparative federalism literature as a crucial explanatory factor for variations 
in (political) subnational autonomy. This analysis accounts for such hypothesis 
controlling for different political factors. One hypothesis suggests that subnational 
fiscal autonomy has to do with the competitiveness of the subnational political system. 
More competitive subnational electoral system can led federal governments to pass 
more fiscal resources to the subnational level, if they expect their partisans to win in 
subnational elections (O’Neill 2005). Thus, the robustness of the results is controlled 
with a measure of subnational party competition in subnational elections. Electoral 
competition is measured on the basis of the effective number of competing candidates 
(or electoral coalitions) in each gubernatorial contest (ENC). The effective number of 
candidates is expressed by the Laakso and Taagepera index.32 This index has become 
somewhat of the standard measure for the comparative analysis of party systems 
(Caulier and Dumont 2005).33
Another measure to estimate the effect of the competition in the subnational political 
system is the majority distance in the gubernatorial elections (MD_GOV). This measure 
takes the democratization process in Mexico into account and serves as an approximation 
to the political weight of governors in control of the political arena.34 In addition, several 
studies argue that the political representation of subnational governments at the 
federal level is decisive for extracting additional resources, for example via clientelist 
relationships from the center (Behrend 2011; Gibson 2005). The analysis here measures 
32  This index can be calculated as  where  is the share of votes for every candidate .
33  However, it has been argued that this measure does not apply well to some empirical situations, as 
it over-counts the larger party (Molinar 1991) and increases consistently with greater atomization. In 
order to address these critics the robustness of the findings were tested employing the alternative 
Molinar index of , where  is the Laakso and Taagepera index, and  is the 
proportion of the votes of the winning candidate squared (ENC_M). The results of the analysis did 
not change. 
34  It is calculated as v1 - v2, where v1 is the vote share of the candidate in first place and v2 is the 
share of the runner-up candidate. The robustness of the results is also checked with an alternative 
indicator: the margin of victory in the governor’s race (MARGIN_GOV). It is calculated as v1 - 0.5, 
where v1 is the vote share of the candidate in the first place.
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malapportionment to control for these insights. Malapportionment is measured as the 
difference between the subnational population share and the subnational vote shares 
in the senate in both countries (MAL_S). In the case of Mexico, the mixed electoral 
system (combining proportional representation and majority representation) effectively 
addresses malapportionment in the case of the Chamber of Deputies. Still, a minor 
degree of malapportionment can be found in the Senate. Finally, the analysis controls 
for the effects of party politics: i.e. if the subnational government is part of or allied to 
the country’s dominant political party. A dummy variable measures if the subnational 
government is part of the PRI party in Mexico (PRI_GOV). The rationale behind this 
variable is to control for alternative explanations that link subnational autonomy to the 
partisan ties of the federal government party.
4.1 Model Specification and Estimation Results
The following analysis applies a multivariate regression analysis in order to study the 
effects of external factors on subnational revenue autonomy in Mexican states in the 
period 1990 to 2012. Generally speaking this regression analysis is concerned with 
the study of dependence of the subnational revenue autonomy on various explanatory 
variables, “with a view to estimate the average value of the former in terms of the 
known values of the latter” (Gujarati and Porter 2009: 18).35 In the case of the following 
analysis, OLS estimation is biased as the intercepts are correlated with the explanatory 
variables, highlighting the influence of omitted variables. However, because both data 
sets combine observations of characteristics that vary over time and between the units, 
this problem can effectively be addressed. Panel data allows controlling for omitted 
variables and omitted heterogeneity.36 Therefore, the following regression analysis 
applies estimation methods which enable a correction of this problem. In addition, 
preliminary tests (Durbin-Watson Test, Box-Pierce Test and Breusch Godfrey Test) of 
models that estimate the effect of external effects on subnational revenue autonomy 
via a standard OLS estimation disclose the existence of (serial) autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. In addition, statistical tests reveal a relatively high heterogeneity 
of the degree of revenue autonomy between subnational units and over time. In sum, 
there is good reason to believe that panel data estimation techniques provide more 
35 Applied to this study the basic idea behind multivariate regression analysis is to test the average 
effect the external factors on subnational autonomy, controlling for the influence of other variables. 
Most commonly regression analysis applies an ordinary least square estimator (OLS) as method of 
estimation. However, OLS regression is tied to several strong assumptions, which if not met result in 
a biased and inefficient estimation.
36 In this analysis heterogeneity means that subnational units are assumed to be fundamentally different 
from one other. Ordinary OLS estimation does not take this into account, consequently omitting 
such variables causes a bias in estimation. Likewise OLS estimation cannot evaluate time series 
variables, which influence the behavior of subnational units in a uniform way, but differently in each 
time period (Kennedy 2003: 282).
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efficient estimation results. Three of such techniques are used: a pooled OLS model, 
a fixed effects model with a within-group estimator (FEM) and random effects model 
(REM). The random effects specification for the model is the following:
 
where:  = is the intercept of each independent variable;  = the entity,  = 1....32; 
 = time,  = 1990....2012;  =  ;  = the cross-section error component for 
each ;  = idiosyncratic term.
Table 2 presents the estimations results of the three models for subnational revenue 
autonomy as the dependent variable. The pooled OLS estimation does not account for 
the heterogeneity between subnational units, and reduces the degrees of freedom. In 
addition, statistical test indicate the presence of panel effects. Moreover, the Hausman 
test (Hausman 1978) indicates that the REM specifications is inconsistent and thus the 
fixed effects model specification is chosen as the most efficient estimation. In addition, 
the Breusch Godfrey test for panel models (Godfrey 1978) indicates the existence of 
serial correlation and the Breusch Pagan test (Breusch and Pagan 1980) suggests 
the presence of heteroscedasticity. In order to control for cross-sectional and serial 
correlation robust covariance matrix estimators, as proposed by Driscoll and Kraay 
(1998), are calculated and presented in Table 2.37
Before interpreting the effects of each variable in detail, it should be noted that the 
coefficients presented include both the within-entity and between-entity effects. In 
the case of TSCS data, the coefficients represent the average effect of the external 
variable over the discretionary revenue when the external variable changes across 
time and between states by one unit. The FEM model specification addresses the 
omitted variable bias by focusing on the within-entity variation excluding time-invariant 
effects. Thus time-invariant characteristics of Mexican states, like the presence of oil 
exploration, are absent in the model. 
37 Such robust standard errors are frequently used in the literature. However, some scholars blamed 
these technique as a easy way to overcome problems of model misspecification (King and Roberts 
2015). A further improvement of the model therefore should take these concerns into account and, if 
needed, respecify the model. 
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Table 2: Results of Multivariate Regression Analysis with Three Models
 Discretionary Revenue Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
FDI per capita (log) -0.005 (0.013) 0.018*** (0.003) 0.020*** (0.004)
Unemployment * Crisis 
year -0.021 (0.014) -0.037
*** (0.007) -0.034*** (0.007)
GSP/capita (log) * Crisis 
year 0.068
** (0.030) 0.116*** (0.024) 0.112*** (0.031)
Crisis year -0.180** (0.076) -0.256*** (0.082) -0.250*** (0.096)
International Oil price 0.002*** (0.001) 0.003***  (0.0005) 0.003*** (0.001)
Oil-producing state 0.171*** (0.034)  0.153 (0.123)
Aportaciones per capita 
(log) -0.041
*** (0.004) -0.008* (0.004) -0.009* (0.005)
Debt per capita (log) 0.031* (0.016) 0.006 (0.013) 0.006 (0.009)
GSP per capita (log) 0.616*** (0.045) 0.111 (0.081) 0.187* (0.097)
Unemployment 0.007 (0.017) -0.016** (0.007) -0.015** (0.007)
Gini 0.219 (0.814) -2.174*** (0.325 ) -2.247*** (0.274)
PRI Governor -0.023 (0.033) -0.020* (0.012) -0.021* (0.012)
ENC -0.197** (0.088) -0.024 (0.020) -0.028 (0.026)
Majority distance 
governor’s race -1.476
*** (0.387) -0.310*** (0.089) -0.338*** (0.109)
Malapportionment 
Senate 0.457 (1.009) 0.943 (0.702) 0.585 (0.977)
Constant 7.412*** (0.689)  9.005*** (0.299)
N 493 493 493
R-squared 0.641 0.798 0.815
Adj. R-squared 0.621 0.723 0.789
F Statistic 56.873
*** 125.783*** 140.085*** 
(df = 15; 477) (df = 14; 447) (df = 15; 477) 
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 
Source: Own elaboration.
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In general, the estimation results confirm that external effects, even if controlling for 
alternative explanations, exert a significant effect on subnational revenue autonomy 
in Mexican states during the observation period. This overall result underlines the 
importance to take external economic developments into account in order to explain the 
dynamics of fiscal autonomy of state governments in Mexico. Moreover, it is a strong 
indication to include the external dimension in the analysis of dynamics in Mexican 
federal relations.
However, the estimation results show that the effects of external factors on subnational 
revenue autonomy are not uniform. In general, as mentioned in Section 3, this is due 
to the particularities of three “institutional filters” in the regime of fiscal distribution in 
Mexico. The interaction between these domestic conditions and changing external 
factors explains processes of increasing inequality in fiscal autonomy between 
subnational units as well as of subnational units in relation to the center. In other words, 
inequalities of income are interdependent, in the sense that they are produced and re-
produced by domestic and external dynamics.
For example, the positive and significant influence of states’ per capita FDI on 
subnational revenue autonomy is consistent with the bias of the nature of the regime 
of fiscal distribution priming economically dynamic states. One explanation for this 
relationship is that FDI primes an already existing high economic development in some 
states, as they are concentrated in the states with the largest economies. FDI may 
therefore reflect and even accentuate the existing economic disequilibria that structure 
the differences in subnational revenue autonomy. In addition, given the regime of 
fiscal distribution, an increase in economic activity is likely to be rewarded by higher 
automatic federal transfers.38 Moreover, states with a strong economy also tend to 
have higher shares of non-tax revenue, particularly in the case of Mexico City.39 
Estimations results show that in a crisis year, if coupled with an increase in subnational 
unemployment, the state accumulates less discretionary revenue. This relationship 
is significant in both the FEM and REM specification and shows the way that the 
participaciones system magnifies crises for the subnational level. However, if a 
state can grow despite being in a crisis year, it is likely to acquire more discretionary 
revenue. One explanation for this observation, confirmed in this analysis by the 
positive and significant relationship between the interaction of a crisis year and the 
38 With the financial reform in 2007, which placed economic success for the distribution of the revenues 
above the revenue level of 2007, this effect was even enlarged.
39 This hypothesis is supported if the difference between the average revenue autonomy of Mexican 
states that export disproportionally much (per capita) (high-exporting) and the ones with a low share 
of export for the period from 2007 to 2012 (in which data is available) are plotted against each other.
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states’ economic growth, is the zero sum nature of the participaciones system and the 
partial distribution of automatic transfers on the basis of economic performance. In 
contrast, the existence of a crisis year has a significant negative effect on subnational 
revenue autonomy, which is consistent in all three specifications. This reinforces the 
argument in this analysis that states can “save” themselves from national crisis effects 
if their economy can grow. In addition, subnational revenue autonomy in Mexico is 
only affected in a crisis year if a crisis can “trickle down” to the subnational level. In 
other words, if a crisis causes a reduction of subnational economic performance or a 
rise in subnational unemployment which impairs the allocation of performance-related 
automatic transfers and decreases the (although generally low) revenue collection 
ability of Mexican states. Thus, in general, the influence of a crisis on subnational 
revenue autonomy is explainable by the existence of the high concentration of tax 
authority in Mexico.  
The nature of fiscal distribution, i.e. the absence of a direct compensational mechanism 
for oil extraction, and the high centralization of tax authority also explain the positive 
and significant effect of the rise of the international oil price in subnational revenue 
autonomy. This effect, robust for all model specifications, is explicable by the great 
importance of oil revenue for public finances in Mexico. The centralization of such 
revenues at the federal level and the distribution of part of these revenues collectively 
to all states is the main mechanism behind this effect. The direct compensation of oil 
producing provinces, omitted in the FEM specification, is not significant in the REM. 
As a result one can conclude that, although oil- producing provinces have on average 
higher revenue autonomy across time and in comparison to non-oil producing states,40 
this feature does not explain changes between states and during time in a statistically 
significant way.  
Finally, the robustness of these findings is enhanced by the performance of the control 
variables. The influence of the eight control variables is almost completely consistent 
with a priori expectations and the existing empirical literature on decentralization and 
comparative federalism. In Mexico, the socio-economic control variables confirm the 
significant structural disadvantage of economically weak and socially underdeveloped 
states to obtain a higher degree of subnational revenue autonomy. The significance 
of an increasing gubernatorial competition is in line with the assumption about the 
reasons for decentralization in Mexico (Díaz Cayeros 2006). Federal governments 
tend to channel additional resources to the subnational level, if electoral competition 
is increasingly competitive. Finally, malapportionment in the Senate does not, as 
40 One can argue that this is due to the strong contribution of the oil industry to the subnational economic 
performance. Such provinces are then to a minor degree indirectly compensated due to their higher 
economic activity.
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expected, show a significant effect on subnational revenue autonomy. In sum, these 
results indicate that the regression models are relatively well specified and lend an 
additional degree of confidence in the results. 
These findings can also enhance the understanding of the multi-level effect of 
external economic developments on subnational revenue autonomy. One possibility 
is to arrange the results within the analytical framework presented in Section 2. This 
framework takes two dimensions into account: (a) if the resulting effect increases/
decreases the (fiscal) autonomy of subnational units in relation to domestic influence 
and (b) if the interaction between the domestic institutional setting with the specific 
external effect produces a higher/lower autonomy of subnational units via the external 
economic environment. Table 3 combines these two dimensions into a two by two table 
with high and low values of the two dimensions. 
Table 3: Multi-level Effect of External Factors on Subnational Revenue Autonomy
Autonomy from domestic influence
High Low
Autonomy from 
external influence
High GSP growth in crisis year /
Low
FDI
(Export Share)
International Oil price
Trickle down of a crisis 
(crisis year/unemployment)
Crisis year
Source: Own elaboration.
Given the knowledge of the effect of each external factor, one can now relate the 
effect of each external factor within the two dimensions. In the case of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) per capita in Mexican states, one can argue that an increase in FDI will 
led to a rise of in revenue autonomy but also make states with high FDI more reluctant 
to a potential decline which will be reflected in a decrease in discretional revenue. 
Increasing FDI and potentially high exporting states on the other hand will enable 
them to increase their independence from domestic influence. Thus states which can 
attract disproportionately high amounts of FDI can gain higher (fiscal) autonomy from 
domestic influences and at the same time are more exposed to external dynamics 
(low/high). 
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A second possibility would be the effects of external factors which, in combination with 
the existing institutional filters in Mexico, led to a higher autonomy of subnational units 
from domestic and external influence at the same time (high/high). According to the 
results of this estimation, this is for example the case of a subnational unit which is able 
to grow in a year of a federal crisis.
Finally, the opposite scenario is present in the case of the change in the international oil 
price, the trickle-down effect of a crisis year, i.e. the rise of subnational unemployment 
during a crisis year, or the presence of a crisis year. Given the high fiscal centralization 
and the importance of unconditional transfers for discretionary revenue of Mexican 
states these factors result in a lower autonomy from both domestic and external 
influence. 
5. Conclusion
This paper aimed to offer a better understanding of the interdependence between 
global process and federal relations. This inter-relation is largely absent in the current 
literature of comparative federalism in Latin America. A first approximation to better 
account for this interaction is demonstrated in this paper. In particular, the study of 
subnational revenue autonomy in Mexico found strong support for the hypothesis of a 
close relationship between the two processes. The concept of subnational autonomy, 
describing the amount of discretionary revenue subnational governments have at their 
disposal, served as good instrument allowing the analysis of the multi-dimensional 
translation of external economic developments to subnational finances. 
The analysis presented here demonstrates how external economic developments 
exerted a structural influence on subnational fiscal autonomy in Mexico in the period 
from 1990-2012. This influence is significant even when controlling for other possible 
explanations and domestic factors. This evidence underlines the inference that global 
economic factors should be of constant relevance for the dynamics in subnational 
fiscal autonomy. Still, as described in Section 4, the specific effects of the transmission 
of external economic developments via the three channels – crisis, the integration into 
the global market and the access to international capital markets – are by no means 
uniform but are themselves also mediated by the existing institutional filters which 
mold the effect of each external factor. Specifically, these institutional filters are: the 
structure of the tax system, i.e. the concentration of tax authority at the federal level, 
the absence of a direct compensational mechanism for oil exploiting states, and finally 
the overall non-redistributive nature of the unconditional transfer system. 
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Statistically, this is demonstrated by the use of interaction terms. The constellation of 
these institutional filters explain the individual effects on subnational revenue autonomy 
of each of the factors elaborated for the three transmission channels: the international 
oil price, subnational oil exploration, per capita FDI, the interaction of a crisis year 
with subnational unemployment, the interaction of a crisis year with the Gross State 
Product (GSP) or the presence of a crisis year. The fixed effects estimation indicated 
that the effect of each of these factors has a significant effect on the revenue autonomy 
of Mexican states. This effect is positive in the case of FDI per capita, a rise in GSP 
during a crisis year and a rise in the international oil price. The effect is negative in 
the case of a rise in the subnational unemployment rate during a crisis year and the 
general presence of a crisis. 
 
Apart from the empirical results, the overall insight from this analysis is that global 
economic developments have an important impact on subnational autonomy. This 
autonomy can be theorized in relation to external influence as well as from domestic 
influence. Given the institutional filters present in Mexican federalism, one can for 
example argue that states  which can attract disproportionate high amount of FDI can 
gain a higher (fiscal) autonomy from domestic influences are likewise more exposed 
to external dynamics. The paper presented a preliminary framework to assess the 
multi-dimensional effect of each external factor with respect of an increase of revenue 
autonomy in relation to external as well as domestic influence. 
The result of this exercise can also inform further studies of federal politics and 
inequality. One possibility would be to ask whether subnational governments used 
additional discretionary resources to introduce inequality-reducing policies or whether 
such governments positively affected by global economic conditions used such 
resources to establish or increase networks of citizen support, either via increasing 
clientelist relationships or via the realization of popular policies. In addition, this 
analysis may inform future studies of federal relations. Such studies should explore 
which additional conditions enable subnational governments to take advantage of 
an increase in subnational fiscal autonomy to gain greater leverage from lower or 
higher tier administrations. Further research is needed to explore these questions, that 
acounts properly for the external dimension of federal politics.
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6. Appendix 
Table 4: Data Sources
 
Variable Data Source
Discretionary Revenue Instituto Nacional Estadística y Geografía (INEGI).
Estadística de finanzas públicas estatales y municipales.
Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI)
Secretaría de Economía. Dirección General de Inversión 
Extranjera.
Crisis year Reinhardt und Rogoff (2009, 2011)
International Oil price World Bank, World Development Indicators
Oil-producing state INEGI
Aportaciones INEGI, Estadística de finanzas públicas estatales y 
municipales.
Debt Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Información 
proporcionada por las Entidades Federativas)
Gross Social 
Product (GSP) 
INEGI, Producto interno bruto por entidad federativa
Subnational 
Unemployment
Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE). 
Anuarios Estadísticos de las Entidades Federativas 
(varios años)
Subnational Gini Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de 
Desarollo Social (CONEVAL) con base en el MCS-ENIGH 
2008, 2010 y 2012.
PRI Governor Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE), Institutos Electorales 
EstatalesEffective number of 
candidates (ENC)
Majority distance (MD) 
governor’s race
Malapportionment 
Senate
Senado de la República, México
Population INEGI
Exports INEGI, Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de México
Source: Own elaboration.
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Table 5: Operationalization of External Factors, Mexico
 Concept / Variable Mexico
C
ris
is
Economic crisis effects Interaction between annual GSP growth and crisis year (CRISIS_RR*VARGDP)
Social crisis effects Interaction between state’s official unemployment rate and crisis year (CRISIS_RR*PARO)
Crisis year Crisis year (CRISIS_RR)
In
te
gr
at
io
n 
in
to
 th
e 
gl
ob
al
 
m
ar
ke
t
Export activity  
Commodity reliance
International price for oil (OIL) 
Oil producing state (PETRO)
G
lo
ba
l 
ca
pi
ta
l 
m
ar
ke
ts Foreign direct 
investments (FDI) 
Per capita foreign direct investments per state 
(CFDI)
Source: Own elaboration.
Table 6: Correlation: Subnational Revenue Autonomy and External Factors in 
Mexico, 1990-2012
 Discretional Revenue
Crisis year -0.347
International Oil price  0.553
Oil producing province  0.043
Export activity (per capita)  0.239
Foreign direct investment (FDI)  0.463
Subnational debt*  0.535
Source: Own elaboration, Spearman correlation coefficient;
* Subnational debt includes external and domestic debt
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Figure 1: Heterogeneity of Revenue Autonomy of Mexican States, 1990-2012 
Source: Own elaboration; mean log per capita values; 0.95 confidence intervals.
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Effect plots 
Figure 2: Interaction of Crisis and per capita GSP (log) in discretionary per capita 
Revenue (log)
Figure 3: Interaction of Crisis and Unemployment in discretionary per capita 
Revenue (log)
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Figure 4: Oil and discretionary per capita Revenue (log)
Figure 5: FDI per capita (log) and discretionary per capita Revenue (log)
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Figure 6: Crisis and discretionary per capita Revenue (log)
Source: Own elaboration for all effect plot figures..
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México, Fideicomiso Historia de las Américas, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 
135-179.
Carmagnani, Marcello, and Bidart Campos, Germán José (1993): Federalismos 
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